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Abstract
This essay contains a critical analysis of common understandings of pain in animals and
challenges common arguments for the presence of phenomenological pain sensations in non-
human animals. I will argue that (i) pain behaviours are neither necessary nor sufficient for pain
sensations, (ii) the presence of nerve structures in non-human animals which are similar to that of
humans are not sufficient for pain sensations, (iii) we cannot rely on similarities between human
and  non-human  experiences  of  pain  to  argue  for  the  presence  of  pain  sensations  in
animals, unless we think that animals are self-conscious in the same way that humans are.  In
addition to this, possible moral implications of denying sensory pains in animals are discussed,
as well  as considering what animal pain experiences might be like  if we reject the common
understanding  of  animal  pain;  these  considerations  appeal  to  the  arguments  made  by Peter
Carruthers, who suggests an answer as to what non-human animals might experience in lieu of a
sensory  or  phenomenological  experience  of  pain.  Though  this  analysis  of  animal  pain  is
inconclusive as to the question of the existence of animal pains, it suggests that the likely hood of
phenomenological  pain  sensations  in  non-human  animals  is  low.  Further,  its  goal  is  to
demonstrate  to  the  reader  that  our  common  understandings  of  and  arguments  for  pain
experiences in animals are not as sound as we may be inclined to think. Some caveats regarding
the implications of accepting this argument are offered, and demonstrate that we need to abandon
our empathetic inclinations towards these creatures in order to accept this conclusion. 
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Understanding Pain in Non-Human Animals: a Critical Exploration of Arguments
               As humans, we are quite aware that phenomenological pain sensations exist, as we
experience them almost daily. It is obvious to us that a stubbed toe or a sliced finger has a painful
feeling associated with the bodily damage; that is, we feel “An unpleasant sensory and emotional
experience  associated  with  actual  or  potential  tissue  damage,  or  described  in  terms  of  such
damage” (Murat, 2013) We do not question our own ability to feel pain, and most often we don’t
question  this  ability  in  other  humans,  because  not  only  do  they display  pain  behaviours  of
aversion or discomfort, (a facial display of pain, the common exclamation of “Ouch!” or other
expletives) but they are also able to verbally describe their individual pain experience. On the
other hand, it is not quite as obvious that non-human animals share the same phenomenological
sensations of pain that humans do. That is to say, we cannot be sure that bodily damage has the
same feeling of pain in animals that we experience as humans. While it is tempting to imagine
that animals have the same types of painful sensations associated with bodily harm that humans
do, based solely on the animal’s ability to display apparent pain-behaviours, I would like to argue
that  there  are  many  other  considerations  to  be  taken  into  account  before  coming  to  this
conclusion. If we hope to critically evaluate this claim, we must also ask: what constitutes a pain
sensation, and makes it possible? What are the ways in which we (humans) feel pains, and do
these  qualities  apply  to  non-humans  animals?  And  lastly,  is  consciousness  necessary  for
phenomenological pain sensations?
The first step that must be taken to further understand the possibility of pain in non-
human animals, is the acknowledgement that a display of pain behaviour is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the experiencing of pain sensations. Two useful examples of this come from Hilary
Putnam; the logical possibilities of the “super stoic” and the “perfect pretender”. In the case of
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the super stoic, we imagine a person who has phenomenological pain sensations, but fails to
produce  any  pain  behaviour  associated  with  these  feelings.  (Ravenscroft,  2005)  In  a  more
applied case, we can think of times when not displaying visual cues of pain experience may be
required; for example, receiving a bee sting is rather painful and would usually produce pain
behaviours, but we may choose not to make a display of the pain felt when at a wedding, because
it would not be appropriate to cry out or change facial expressions. In this case, though pain is
felt,  there  is  no  pain  behaviour  to  accompany  it,  demonstrating  that  pain  displays  are  not
necessary for being in the conscious mental state of pain. In the case of the perfect pretender,
Putnam imagines a person who feels no pain but is very adept at imitating the pain behaviours of
others so that they are very convincing in their ability to appear to be in pain. (Ravenscroft,
2005) To illustrate this, one may refer to some soccer players who “dive” during games and
emerge clutching a limb; that is, they appear to be injured in order to make it appear as though a
foul  has  been  committed.  The  players  are  not  in  a  state  of  pain  and  yet  are  very  good  at
convincing those around them that they have been injured. Based on this example, it  can be
concluded that pain behaviours are not sufficient for the experience of pain sensations. So, when
enquiring into the possibility of pain sensations in animals we cannot draw the conclusion that
they do experience conscious pain sensations based exclusively on their ability to display pain
behaviours, since pain behaviours are neither necessary nor sufficient for pain sensations. 
When considering the capacity for  animals  to experience conscious  pain sensations,
another common suggestion appeals to the animal’s biology; they have nerve structures that send
signals to the brain as humans do, therefore, they must also have some sensory experience when
they are touched. However, why should we think that nerve sensors throughout the body that
send  information  to  the  brain  would  have  the  capacity  to  translate  that  information  into  a
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phenomenological pain experience? Pain perceptions and sensations are often mistaken for a
phenomenon called nociception. Nociception, simply put, is the body’s ability to sense noxious
stimuli. (Allen & Trestman, 2015) This involves the nerve endings detecting sensory information
and sending it to the brain in order to alert it to the body’s condition and surroundings. However,
the ability of the body to send signals of damage, danger, or alternatively, of safety and pleasure,
does not suggest that any phenomenological feeling would necessarily accompany these signals.
For example, a deer being attacked by some predator,  is alerted that the body is undergoing
damage by the nerves; the nerves pick up sensory information of claws digging into skin, and
send this information of damage to the brain, which then triggers the flight response to remove
the deer from the danger. Similarly, a cat who purrs when stroked, only does so because the
signals sent to the brain convey that this is a safe situation and physically relaxes the animal. In
both cases, the animal does not necessarily have any feeling associated with the nerve signals, it
is simply disposed to seek safety and avoid bodily damage. Allen and Trestman suggest that the
Anterior  Cingulate  Cortex (ACC) is  particularly important in this  regard for mammals.  This
section of the brain picks up sensory signals and produces the behavioural response that we so
commonly see in animals: the fight or flight response. However, the ACC is not present in non-
mammals such as fish which may suggest that they may not be as adept as mammals in their
detection of bodily damage, which would explain their diminished aversive behaviours. (Allen &
Trestman, 2015)  Based on the evidence provided by nociception, showing that nerves sending
signals to the brain does not always give rise to a sensory experience, it seems that we cannot
appeal  to  the  presence  of  nerve  structures  in  non-human  animals  as  evidence  of
phenomenological pain sensations. 
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When inquiring into the question of whether animals can feel pain, we often refer back
to our own pain experiences, which can be helpful in drawing distinctions in some instances.
However, we need to be cautious when relying on similarities between our own experiences and
those of non-human animals when attempting to answer the question of whether or not animals
feel pain. It is easy to establish and accepted that humans can experience pain sensations, and
this is  not a particularly interesting philosophical question,  as we all  experience pain almost
daily. However, it seems that these phenomenological sensations are possible only when humans
are in a natural state of consciousness. That is to say, when we are able to recognize ourselves as
being the subject of our experiences, in which a particular mental state is conscious rather than
having body systems that are conscious as a whole. For instance, in a deep sleep, we are not
conscious of our surroundings, have no self-awareness and are unable to feel any bodily pains or
sensations. Minor disturbances such as an itch on the nose do not feel like anything to us, but a
response (itching the nose) may still  take place non-consciously.  More intense sensations or
pains however, must take place consciously, which is why we are awakened into consciousness
when, for example, your pet cat bites your toes. Similarly, humans do not experience painful
sensations when under the effects of anesthesia, because the drug disconnects the body from
pathways in the brain which normally give rise to the phenomenological pain sensations of the
mind. (Humphries, 2011) Even in cases of anesthesia that leaves the patient fully “awake” yet
unable to feel pain, such as in the case of epidurals given to mothers during childbirth, the patient
is not then in a natural state of consciousness, but an altered one in which certain brain functions
and neural pathways have been shut down to prevent the body from sensing pain. In both of
these cases, it seems that consciousness is necessary for human pain sensations. So, if humans,
who  undoubtedly  experience  pain  sensations  cannot  have  these  experiences  without  the
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necessary condition of consciousness, why then, would we expect animals to be capable of these
pain sensations if they themselves are not conscious? This, of course, is assuming the generally
accepted conclusion that while animals have mental states (they can have thoughts about their
immediate environments), they do not have conscious mental states; that is, they cannot have
higher order thoughts, and most of them are not conscious in the sense of having a concept of
self. If this is the case, it seems that animals, like humans, would be incapable of feeling pain if
they were not in a natural state of consciousness. Additionally, if it is the case that non-human
animals also must have self-conscious awareness to experience pain sensations, it may be that
the animal experience of pain is analogous to patients under anaesthetic (the nerve signals sent to
the brain do not produce any painful sensation). So, when considering the question of animal
pain perceptions, if  calling upon the similarities between humans and non-human animals in
terms  of  biological  bodily  response,  we  must  accept  that  if  consciousness  is  necessary  for
phenomenological pains in humans, it  must also be so in non-human animals. Therefore, we
cannot rely on similarities between human and animal experiences of pain, unless we think that
animals are self-conscious in the same way that humans are.
If it is the case that non-human animals do not have phenomenological sensations of
pain, we are left to ask the question as to what their experience would be like. Carruthers’ answer
to this question is that perhaps animals do have bodily pains and experiences, but that these pains
do not feel like anything to them; they are non-conscious pain experiences. Carruthers argues
that non-conscious experiences are quite common, and as humans we can have these types of
experiences; instances where our bodies go through the motions, but we fail to become aware
that we are participating in the experience. This can be illustrated through Carruthers’ example of
washing dishes while listening to a particularly enjoyable piece of music. It is easy to become so
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transfixed  on  the  pleasure  of  the  musical  experience  that  we  become  unaware  of  the  dish
washing experience, and as a result are surprised when the song ends, to see that the dishes are
clean. In this example, we have had the experience of washing the dishes, but it didn’t feel like
anything  to  us  as  it  was  a  non-conscious  experience.  (Carruthers,  1989)  
This  example  may be  comparable  to  an  animal’s  experience  of  pain;  it  is  a  non-conscious
experience,  meaning  there  is  no  feeling  or  awareness  of  the  experience,  but  it  is  still  an
experience none the less. This argument is strengthened by the similarities found in blindsight
patients; that is, people who have lost conscious awareness of a portion of their visual field.
Though these patients have no awareness of the information received from one section of their
visual field, they are very successful at identifying and even picking up objects within that area,
even though they have not consciously seen anything there. Carruthers argues that these people
are having non-conscious experiences of the objects in their visual field, in which information
about the experience is “made available for integration into actions, [but is] not available to
conscious thought.” (Carruthers, 1989) This is to say that the blindsight patient is able to put the
information received non-consciously into practice by picking up the ball, but is not aware of
having  seen  the  ball.  Similarly,  a  non-human  animal  is  able  to  react  to  an  injury  through
avoidance of the cause of the pain, but the pain does not feel like anything to the animal because
it is not conscious of having felt it. Therefore, the animal’s experience of the physical damage
has no phenomenal properties. This can also be understood through the experience of split brain
patients  who have  had  their  Corpus  Callosum severed,  rendering  the  brain  as  two separate
hemispheres with no communication between the two. In these cases the left-brain is clearly
conscious and able to communicate, while the right brain cannot communicate. In the case of the
split brain patient it is commonly concluded that the right brain acts as “an automaton lacking in
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conscious awareness.” (Block, 1997) From this case we may draw a similar conclusion for the
experiences of animals; they are like non-conscious automata which have experiences but are not
conscious of them, and so participation in these experiences doesn’t feel like anything to them.  
After examining arguments concerning the capability of animals to feel pain, we are left
with an important practical consideration: if non-human animals do not feel pain, how should
this  affect  our  actions  towards  them?  Carruthers  argues  that  since  their  pains  do  not  have
phenomenological  qualities  and  do  not  feel  like  anything  to  them,  rationally  and  logically
speaking, we should have no moral obligation regarding causing pain in non-human animals.
However, while cutting off a dog’s leg may not cause it any pain, the dog will have a much more
difficult  time  getting  around,  finding  food  etc.  and  therefore,  we  likely  have  some  moral
obligation to not cause other living things undo harm, even if the harm caused is not painful,
because it results in a lower quality of life with added challenges for the animal. (Carruthers,
1989) It can be seen that, at the very least, animals in physically threatening situations display
pain  behaviours  that  demonstrate  being  in  a  state  of  distress,  whether  they  are  consciously
experiencing pain sensations or not. Because animals (like humans) are predisposed to avoid
physical damage to the body, it would be wrong to cause damage to these creatures, regardless of
being  able  to  prove  their  experience  of  conscious  pain  perceptions  and  phenomenological
sensations. Additionally, it should be noted that a major shift has occurred in veterinary practice
in which practitioners now widely use anesthetics during animal operations under the premise
that they feel pain, which was certainly not the case prior to this shift. (Allen & Trestman, 2015)
 To conclude, I would like to assert that it is unclear at this time whether or not non-
human animals have phenomenological experiences of pain; and if some do, which ones we can
attribute phenomenological pains to remains unclear as well. Due to the uncertainty surrounding
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this issue, we should also continue to challenge our assumptions and think critically about the
reasons why we might hold the strong intuition that non-human animals feel and experience pain
in the same way we do. However, in light of the many doubts we may have surrounding this
question, it would seem unjust and immoral to treat these creatures as if they didn’t feel pain. 
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